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BENAY v. WARNER BROS. 
ENTERTAINMENT, INC.:                     
NEW STANDARD NEEDED FOR 
DETERMINING ACTUAL USE 
INTRODUCTION 
Picture a screenwriter who watches a movie and realizes that its 
storyline is similar to a screenplay that she registered with the United 
States Copyright Office.1  The copyright prevents others from copying 
the screenwriter’s method of expressing ideas.2  Further suppose that the 
screenwriter attempted to sell her screenplay to the film’s producer some 
time before the release of the movie, but her screenplay was rejected.  
Nevertheless, the two stories share the same familiar settings, historical 
facts, and situations that are customary for their genre.  For instance, 
envision that the two works are about Japanese samurai and share such 
elements as martial arts, decorative armor, and fight scenes involving the 
use of katanas.3 
One cause of action the screenwriter may plead is copyright 
infringement pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 501(b).4  In this context, the court 
would interpret federal law to determine if the screenwriter is afforded 
relief.5  Suppose that the screenwriter brings a copyright infringement 
 1 The United States Copyright Office reviews copyright applications and issues certificates 
of registration when all the registration formalities are satisfied.  17 U.S.C.A. § 410 (Westlaw 2011). 
 2 Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 3 Katana is a moderately curved, single-edged sword historically associated with Japanese 
samurai.  Katana Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/katana (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2011). 
 4 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(b) (Westlaw 2011). 
 5 Id. 
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action and alleges that the production company copied aspects of her 
screenplay without permission.  The court will require a showing of 
substantial similarity between the screenwriter’s copyrighted work and 
the alleged infringing work for the screenwriter to prevail.6  Since the 
copyright infringement standard for substantial similarity is a high 
burden to meet, the screenwriter will not find relief under federal law by 
merely showing similarities between characteristics that typically arise 
from the two works’ shared genre.7 
Imagine that the screenwriter also pleads a separate cause of action 
for breach of contract.  Courts in this context refer to state law to 
determine if a contract existed and if the defendant breached the 
agreement.8  Although breach of an express contract may be an available 
cause of action, due to their superior bargaining power over 
screenwriters, producers will seldom make explicit agreements.9  The 
screenwriter may nonetheless plead a breach of an implied-in-fact 
contract.  A California claim for breach of an implied-in-fact contract 
over the use of an idea also requires substantial similarity between the 
works, but California has a much lower standard of proof for substantial 
similarity than a federal copyright infringement claim.10  Either cause of 
action, however, may provide the plaintiff protection of rights to his or 
her creative work.11  While the availability of multiple causes of action 
with varying standards of proof may please the screenwriter, it creates 
problems because authors are given too much protection in their creative 
works at the expense of the promotion of art and science. 
In Benay v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was presented with both causes of 
 6 Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 7 See Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 625 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that 
the similarities between the two works were insufficient for copyright infringement, since most 
similarities arose naturally from the two works’ shared premise of an American war veteran who 
travels to Japan to fight the samurai rebellion). 
 8 23 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63:10 (4th ed. 2010). 
 9 Kerry Ryan, Using the Uniform Commercial Code to Protect the “Ideas” That Make the 
Movies, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 693, 697-98 (1987) (discussing producers’ reluctance to make 
express contracts due to their greater bargaining power over screenwriters). 
 10 See Benay, 607 F.3d at 631 (“[O]ur holding (above) that the Screenplay and the Film are 
not substantially similar for purposes of copyright infringement does not preclude a finding of 
substantial similarity for purposes of an implied-in-fact contract under California law.”). 
 11 See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing summary judgment 
on the copyright infringement claim since there were enough similarities between the two works at 
issue to present a triable issue of material fact); see also Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. 
C 706083, 1990 WL 357611, at *15 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 1990) (finding that there were enough 
similarities between the two works at issue for purposes of breach of contract). 
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action and concluded that a lack of substantial similarity under federal 
copyright infringement law did not preclude a finding of substantial 
similarity under California law for breach of an implied-in-fact 
contract.12  Two brothers, Aaron and Matthew Benay (the “Benays”), 
wrote a screenplay entitled The Last Samurai (the “Screenplay”), and 
provided a written copy of the Screenplay to Warner Brothers 
Entertainment, Inc. (“Warner Brothers”).13  The parties created an 
implied-in-fact contract with the mutual understanding that the Benays 
would be compensated if Warner Brothers used the Screenplay to 
produce a movie.14  After Warner Brothers released the film The Last 
Samurai (the “Film”), the Benays brought an action that included claims 
for copyright infringement under federal law and breach of implied-in-
fact contract under California law.15  The Benays alleged that they were 
never compensated after Warner Brothers copied aspects from their 
Screenplay to produce the Film.16  In support of their claim, the Benays 
pointed to similarities in historical facts, common characters, and 
standard scenes that naturally arose from the two works’ shared premise 
of an American war veteran who travels to Japan to fight the samurai 
rebellion.17  These similarities, however, were mere “unprotectable 
elements” that flowed necessarily and naturally from their basic plot 
premise.18  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary 
judgment for Warner Brothers on the federal claim, because substantial 
similarity between mere unprotectable elements is insufficient to prove 
copyright infringement.19  However, the Ninth Circuit reversed and 
remanded the grant of summary judgment on the California law contract 
claim because a showing of substantial similarity between unprotectable 
elements is not necessarily insufficient to prove a breach of an implied-
in-fact contract claim.20 
This Note examines Benay v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., and 
the substantial-similarity standard under a California breach of an 
implied-in-fact contract claim and a federal copyright infringement 
claim.  The standard used in Benay will hinder the free flow of ideas by 
 12 Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 631 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 13 Id. at 622. 
 14 Id. at 622-23. 
 15 Id. at 622. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 625. 
 18 Id. (explaining that unprotectable elements “are shared historical facts, familiar stock 
scenes, and characteristics that flow naturally from the works’ shared basic plot premise”). 
 19 Id. at 629. 
 20 Id. at 632. 
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deterring producers from accepting an author’s screenplay for fear of 
breaching an implied-in-fact contract.  Part I of this Note summarizes the 
history and development of the protection of rights to creative works.  
Part II provides the facts and procedural history of Benay v. Warner 
Bros. Entertainment, Inc.  Part III analyzes and criticizes the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding in Benay.  Finally, Part IV proposes that California’s 
standard for a breach of an implied-in-fact contract claim, like that 
brought by the Benays, should be heightened so that a plaintiff must 
show substantial similarity between protectable elements, not merely 
between unprotectable elements.  This Note proposes a standard that will 
not only promote the purposes of copyright law but also better indicate 
when the plaintiff’s work was actually used in creating the defendant’s 
production. 
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROTECTION OF RIGHTS TO 
 CREATIVE WORKS 
A. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT UNDER FEDERAL LAW 
The enactment of copyright laws in the United States is authorized 
by the Copyright Clause of the federal Constitution, which states, “The 
Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”21  In 
response, Congress has authorized the copywriting of works under 17 
U.S.C. § 501(b), which empowers a copyright holder to institute an 
action for copyright infringement.22  However, an author does not have 
an absolute right to prevent others from creating a similar work.23  
Others are free to use the same fact or idea as the author did, as long as 
they do not copy the author’s original expres 24
A copyright therefore gives limited rights to an author by preventing 
others from copying his or her method of using facts and expressing 
 21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 22 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(b) (Westlaw 2011). 
 23 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (Westlaw 2011) (“In no case does copyright protection for an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
 24 See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879) (“The copyright of a book on 
perspective, no matter how many drawings and illustrations it may contain, gives no exclusive right 
to the modes of drawing described, though they may never have been known or used before.”). 
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ideas.25  While copyright protection instantly attaches upon the creation 
of an original work, registration must be made with the United States 
Copyright Office before a claim for copyright infringement may be 
brought.26  To register a copyright, a registrant must send a completed 
application form, a filing fee, and records of the work to the United 
States Copyright Office.27  The United States Copyright Office reviews 
the application for errors and issues a certificate of registration when all 
the registration formalities are satisfied.28 
In order to prevail on a federal copyright infringement claim, the 
plaintiff must show that he or she owned a copyright, and that the 
defendant copied original elements of the copyrighted work.29  To 
establish the latter, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had access 
to the copyrighted work, and that there is substantial similarity between 
the copyrighted work and the alleged infringing work under two tests: 
the intrinsic test and the extrinsic test.30 
1. The Intrinsic Test 
The intrinsic test is a subjective comparison that focuses on whether 
the ordinary, reasonable audience would find the two works substantially 
similar in their total concept and feel.31  The inquiry must be made 
without expert analysis and requires the plaintiff to prove that an 
ordinary observer would find that the ideas between the two works are 
substantially similar.32  Thus, the pivotal issue is what makes two works 
“substantially similar.” 
In Litchfield v. Spielberg, Lisa Litchfield, the author of a musical 
play entitled Lokey from Maldemar brought suit against the producers of 
the film E.T.: The Extra-Terrestrial for federal copyright infringement, 
among other claims.33  Since expert testimony and the comparison of 
individual features of the works are not appropriate when applying the 
intrinsic test, the only available evidence to infer substantial similarity 
 25 Id. 
 26 17 U.S.C.A. § 411 (Westlaw 2011). 
 27 17 U.S.C.A. § 408 (Westlaw 2011). 
 28 17 U.S.C.A. § 410 (Westlaw 2011). 
 29 Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)). 
 30 See Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that the substantial-
similarity requirement implies a two-pronged analysis of general ideas and the expression of those 
ideas). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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was the total concept and feel of the two works.34  The Ninth Circuit 
observed that Lokey from Maldemar used satire to critique mankind’s 
egotism, whereas E.T.: The Extra-Terrestrial used character 
development to highlight the bond between a child and an extra-
terrestrial.35  Applying the intrinsic test, the so-called “Court of Appeals 
for the Hollywood Circuit”36 held that no reasonable juror would find 
that E.T.: The Extra-Terrestrial was substantially similar to Lokey from 
Maldemar.37 
2. The Extrinsic Test—Protectable Elements Versus Unprotectable 
 Elements 
The extrinsic test is an objective comparison that focuses on 
whether the individual expressive elements of the works are substantially 
similar.38  For instance, the extrinsic test can focus on similarities 
between the plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and 
sequence of events.39  Unlike the intrinsic test, the court “compares, not 
the basic plot ideas for stories, but the actual concrete elements that make 
up the total sequence of events and the relationships between the major 
characters.”40  On a motion for summary judgment, the court applies 
only the extrinsic test, because the intrinsic test is the jury’s exclusive 
responsibility.41  If the plaintiff fails to satisfy the extrinsic test, summary 
judgment is entered for the defendant, but if plaintiff satisfies the 
extrinsic test, there must be a trial on the intrinsic test.42 
In Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, for example, Jeffrey 
Kouf alleged that Walt Disney Pictures & Television’s film Honey, I 
Shrunk the Kids, involving kids who were accidently shrunk by a ray gun 
invention, infringed on his copyrighted screenplay The Formula, about a 
 34 Id. at 1357. 
 35 Id. 
 36 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“For better or worse, we are the Court of Appeals for 
the Hollywood Circuit.”). 
 37 Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1357. 
 38 Id. at 1356. 
 39 See Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 632 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kouf 
v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 40 Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 41 See Benay, 607 F.3d at 632 (“On a motion for summary judgment, we apply only the 
extrinsic test.  The intrinsic test is left to the trier of fact.”); see also Funky Films, Inc. v. Time 
Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying only the extrinsic test and finding 
that the two works at issue were not substantially similar). 
 42 Benay, 607 F.3d at 632. 
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boy genius who invented a formula to shrink people.43  The two works 
had substantially different plots, themes, and sequences of events, given 
that the characters in Honey, I Shrunk the Kids and The Formula were 
“shrunk to different sizes (1/4 inch versus 1 foot), by different means 
(ray gun machine versus liquid formula), for different reasons (accident 
versus evil thieves), [and] with different frequency (once versus several 
times).”44  The mood, setting, and pace differed because The Formula 
was a dark adventure that took place at many different locations in the 
span of a week, whereas Honey, I Shrunk the Kids was a light-hearted 
comedy that took place at the family residence in less than a day.45  
Applying the extrinsic test, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district 
court that the works were not substantially similar.46 
When applying the extrinsic test, the court must separate the 
protectable elements from the unprotectable elements.47  Unprotectable 
elements include stock scenes, historical facts, and themes that are 
staples of literature.48  Unprotectable scènes-à-faire refer to customary 
characters, scenes or situations that naturally arise from a basic plot 
premise.49  An example of scènes-à-faire can be found in Walker v. Time 
Life Films, Inc., involving a book and a film that depicted adventures of a 
New York police department.50  The Second Circuit found that 
“[e]lements such as drunks, prostitutes, vermin and derelict cars would 
appear in any realistic work about . . . policemen in the South Bronx,” 
and were therefore unprotectable scènes-à-faire.51  Furthermore, “[f]oot 
chases and the morale problems of policemen, not to mention the 
familiar figure of the Irish cop, are venerable and often-recurring themes 
of police fiction.”52 
After the elements of the works have been separated, the court must 
inquire into whether the protectable elements, and not the unprotectable 
elements, are substantially similar.53  Copyright protection, thus, cannot 
 43 Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1043 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 44 Id. at 1045. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 1046. 
 47 See Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that there 
was insufficient similarity after the protectable elements were separated from the unprotectable 
elements). 
 48 Id. at 822-23. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 51 Id. at 50. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822. 
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be extended to stock characters or familiar scenes in a story.54  If all the 
similarities between the works arise from the use of unprotectable 
elements, the plaintiff fails to satisfy the extrinsic test.55  In Williams v. 
Crichton, for instance, Geoffrey Williams, author of a series of 
children’s books entitled Dinosaur World, brought an action for 
copyright infringement against the creators of the movie Jurassic Park.56  
The Second Circuit found no infringement because the elements of 
electrified fences, automated tours, and dinosaur nurseries were 
unprotectable scènes-à-faire that inevitably flowed from the two works’ 
shared premise of a dinosaur adventure park.57 
Treating the protectable elements and unprotectable elements 
differently is justified by the distinction between an unprotectable idea 
and the protectable expression of that idea.58  This so-called “idea-
expression dichotomy” means that “[c]opyright law only protects 
expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves.”59  In Baker v. Selden, the 
landmark case explaining the idea-expression dichotomy, Charles Selden 
obtained a copyright for a book on the art of bookkeeping, which he 
called Selden’s Condensed Ledger.60  Baker produced a book with a 
similar bookkeeping method that achieved similar results but was made 
with a different arrangement of columns and headings.61  The United 
States Supreme Court held that Selden’s Condensed Ledger was not 
infringed by Baker’s book, since an author’s original expression is 
protected by copyright, while the facts and ideas explained by the work 
are public property.62  This principle attempts to reward individuals for 
their creativity and effort while at the same time promoting the progress 
of science and art by permitting the public to use the same subject 
matter.63  For fear of granting monopolies over ideas, copyright law 
prevents individuals from taking the basic idea for a story out of the 
circulation of public property.64  The courts have recognized that authors 
must work from ideas within the public domain, and in turn, the courts 
 54 Id. at 823. 
 55 Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 632 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 56 Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 582 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 57 Id. at 589. 
 58 Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 99-101 (1879). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 107. 
 63 Karen L. Poston, All Puff and No Stuff: Avoiding the Idea/Expression Dichotomy, 9 LOY. 
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 337, 343 (1989). 
 64 Id. 
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have created the distinction between protectable elements and 
unprotectable elements.65 
B. EXPRESS CONTRACT UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW 
State law offers protection of rights to creative works under certain 
contractual circumstances.66  While copyright infringement is based on 
federal law,67 breach of contract is independently grounded in state 
law.68  For instance, federal copyright law offers an author protection as 
against everyone, even those who never entered into a contract with the 
author.69  Thus, a screenwriter is able to bring both a federal copyright 
infringement claim and a state breach of contract claim.70  An express 
contract is an agreement the conditions of which are explicitly stated in 
words.71  However, while there are a large number of screenwriters who 
wish to sell their ideas, there are fewer production companies that wish 
to buy screenplays.72  As a result of their superior bargaining power over 
screenwriters, production companies will hardly ever make explicit 
promises, and therefore, express contracts are rarely of help to 
screenwriters.73  However, other causes of action are still available to 
screenwriters. 
C. IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW 
An implied-in-fact contract is one in which the parties’ agreement is 
not expressed in words.74  An implied-in-fact contract, for example, 
includes conditions that are manifested by conduct.75  In the absence of 
an express contract, when a service or good is requested, then 
subsequently rendered or provided, the law infers or implies a promise to 
 65 Id. 
 66 See Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 629 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Contract law, 
whether through express of implied-in-fact contracts, is the most significant remaining state-law 
protection for literary or artistic ideas.”). 
 67 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(b) (Westlaw 2011). 
 68 23 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63:10 (4th ed. 2010). 
 69 See generally Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1043 (9th Cir. 
1994) (recognizing that the plaintiff was able to bring a copyright infringement claim even though a 
contract was never entered into with defendant). 
 70 Id. 
 71 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1:5 (4th ed. 2010). 
 72 Kerry Ryan, Using the Uniform Commercial Code to Protect the ‘Ideas’ That Make the 
Movies, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 693, 697 (1987). 
 73 Id. at 697-98. 
 74 Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 267-68 (Cal. 1956). 
 75 Id. at 269. 
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pay for it.76  If the law obligates the producer to provide compensation 
for the use of the author’s idea and the producer refuses to pay, then the 
implied-in-fact contract has been breached.77 
An author may therefore plead a cause of action for breach of an 
implied-in-fact contract under state law.78  The California Supreme Court 
announced the rule for the formation of an implied-in-fact contract for 
the use of an idea in the case of Desny v. Wilder, the landmark decision 
in so-called “idea submission cases.”79  Victor Desny telephoned the 
office of Billy Wilder, the producer for Paramount Pictures, and read his 
synopsis for a movie to Wilder’s secretary.80  Although Desny never 
directly communicated with Wilder, the secretary had authority to 
receive and transmit messages to Wilder.81 Desny told the secretary that 
Wilder could use the story only if Desny was paid “the reasonable value 
of it.”82  The secretary assured Desny that if Wilder and Paramount 
Pictures used the story, “naturally we will pay you for it.”83  Alleging 
that he was never compensated after his idea was used in Wilder’s 
motion picture photoplay entitled Ace in the Hole, Desny brought an 
action under California law for breach of an implied-in-fact contract.84 
The Desny court held that an implied-in-fact contract exists when 
the author conditions the disclosure of an idea upon an obligation to pay 
for it if used, and the buyer voluntarily accepts the disclosure knowing 
the reasonable value of the work and the condition on which it was 
tendered.85  Merely accepting Desny’s submission of his idea did not 
alone contractually obligate Wilder to compensate Desny.86  Instead, 
Wilder manifested his assent by knowing the condition to pay for the 
disclosure of the idea, and then accepting Desny’s condition.87  The 
conduct of Wilder in accepting the work, therefore, implied a promise to 
fulfill the condition of payment, and as a result, an implied-in-fact 
contract was created.88 
 76 Id. at 266. 
 77 Id. at 270. 
 78 Id. at 278. 
 79 Id. at 274. 
 80 Id. at 262. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 270. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
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1. Federal Preemption of State Law Protection 
Since copyright is governed by federal law89 and idea submission 
claims are built on state law,90 federal law can preempt protection of 
rights to creative works under the Supremacy Clause.91  In 1976, 
Congress invalidated most state copyright laws by enacting the Federal 
Copyright Act, which states in relevant part: 
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are 
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of 
copyright . . . in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright 
. . . are governed exclusively by this title.  Thereafter, no person is 
entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under 
the common law or statutes of any State.92 
Any state law protecting an author’s rights to his or her creative 
work is preempted insofar as the state law falls within the scope of the 
federal law.93  That is, if the plaintiff’s state law contract claim alleges 
rights that are entirely covered by a federal copyright infringement claim, 
then the plaintiff’s state law contract claim will be barred.94  However, a 
state breach of an implied-in-fact contract claim will not be preempted 
by the Federal Copyright Act if the claim alleges an extra element that 
distinguishes it from a federal copyright infringement claim.95 
2. Distinguishing State Law Claims from Federal Law Claims 
In Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., the Ninth Circuit found that a 
federal copyright infringement claim did not preempt a California breach 
of an implied-in-fact contract claim.96  Jeff Grosso submitted his 
screenplay The Shell Game to Miramax Film Corp. with the mutual 
understanding that Grosso would be reasonably compensated if his idea 
 89 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(b) (Westlaw 2011). 
 90 23 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63:10 (4th ed. 2010). 
 91 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”). 
 92 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(a) (Westlaw 2011). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
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was used.97  Grosso filed a breach of contract claim under California law 
and a copyright infringement claim under federal law, alleging that 
Miramax Film Corp. used his idea when it made the movie Rounders, 
which, like The Shell Game, involved poker players in high-stakes games 
of Texas Hold’em.98  The Grosso court affirmed the grant of summary 
judgment for Miramax Film Corp. on the federal copyright infringement 
claim, due to lack of substantial similarity between the two works.99  
Although both works had poker settings, the two works were not 
substantially similar because the only similarities in dialogue arose from 
“the use of common, unprotectable poker jargon.”100  As for the breach 
of contract claim, however, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court 
erred in holding that the state law claim was equivalent to the federal law 
claim.101  The Ninth Circuit held that Grosso’s claim for breach of an 
implied-in-fact contract was not preempted by the Federal Copyright 
Act, because the extra element of an “implied promise to pay” for the use 
of the idea transformed the claim from one arising under federal law to 
one built on state contract law.102 
In an idea submission case, to prevail under California law on a 
breach of an implied-in-fact contract claim, the plaintiff must prove that 
(1) he or she submitted the work for sale to the defendant, (2) he or she 
conditioned the use of the work on payment, (3) the defendant knew or 
should have known of the condition, (4) the defendant voluntarily 
accepted the work, (5) the defendant actually used the work, and (6) the 
work had value.103  The fifth element, actual use of the plaintiff’s idea by 
the defendant, has been the most controversial and difficult to prove in 
idea submission cases.104  California courts permit actual use to be 
inferred from evidence of the defendant’s access to the idea and 
substantial similarity between the defendant’s production and plaintiff’s 
idea.105  The degree of similarity necessary to show actual use depends 
on the conditions of the parties’ contract.106  In breach of express 
contract claims, the degree of similarity required hinges on the terms of 
 97 Id. at 967. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 968. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 629 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Mann v. 
Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522, 533 n.6 (Ct. App. 1982); Faris v. Enberg, 158 Cal. Rptr. 
704, 709 (Ct. App. 1979)). 
 104 See, e.g., Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522, 533 (Ct. App. 1982). 
 105 Id. at 534. 
 106 Benay, 607 F.3d at 630. 
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the agreement.107  In breach of implied-in-fact contract claims, since the 
parties have not specified any terms, “the weight of California authority 
is that there must be substantial similarity between plaintiff’s idea and 
defendant’s production to render defendant liable.”108  This is the law the 
Ninth Circuit applied in Benay v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF BENAY V. WARNER BROS. 
 ENTERTAINMENT, INC. 
The Benays wrote their Screenplay The Last Samurai between 1997 
and 1999, and they registered it with the United States Copyright Office 
in 2001.109  On May 9, 2000, the Benays’ agent, David Phillips, orally 
pitched the Screenplay to Richard Solomon, the President of Production 
for Bedford Falls Productions, Inc. (“Bedford Falls”), a production 
company in association with Warner Brothers.110  On May 16, 2000, 
Phillips provided a written copy of the Screenplay to Solomon with the 
condition that the Benays would be compensated if Bedford Falls used it 
to produce a movie.111  After receiving the Screenplay, Solomon told 
Phillips that Bedford Falls had declined to use the Screenplay because it 
was already developing a similar project.112  On December 5, 2003, 
Bedford Falls and Warner Brothers publicly released the Film The Last 
Samurai.113 
The Screenplay is a fast-paced adventure story based around James 
Gamble, a successful professor living in the United States with his wife 
and son.114  He is haunted by his mistake during the Civil War where he 
accidentally killed eight of his own soldiers.115  At the request of 
President Grant, Gamble travels to Japan to lead the Japanese Imperial 
Army against a samurai rebellion led by a samurai named Saigo.116  
Gamble’s son is killed by Saigo, which sends Gamble into an opium 
addition.117  He is eventually saved from despair by his wife and 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 631 (quoting 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
19D.08[A] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2009)). 
 109 Id. at 622. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 622-23. 
 112 Id. at 623. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
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Masako, a female samurai warrior who betrayed Saigo.118  Gamble then 
seeks to exact revenge by leading the Imperial Army in a series of battles 
against the samurai rebels.119  During the final battle, Saigo kills Masako 
in a sword fight, but Gamble, in turn, kills Saigo.120  The Screenplay 
ends with Gamble returning to the United States, where he lives with his 
wife and a newborn baby named Masako 121
The Film employs a nostalgic and reflective mood driven by Nathan 
Algren, a lonely alcoholic who has just been fired from his job selling 
rifles.122  He is haunted by his participation in a brutal attack on an 
innocent tribe during the Indian Wars.123  Algren is recruited by his 
former commanding officer to travel to Japan to train the Imperial Army 
in modern warfare against the samurai rebellion led by their honorable 
leader named Katsumoto.124  After Algren is captured by samurai 
warriors at the end of the first battle, he is assimilated into the samurai 
way of life.125  He develops a friendship with Katsumoto and begins a 
romantic relationship with Taka, the widow of a samurai warrior.126  He 
learns to appreciate the samurai culture and eventually joins the samurai 
against the Imperial Army.127  After the samurai lose in the final battle 
against the Imperial Army, Algren confronts the Japanese Emperor and 
teaches him the value of traditional samurai culture.128  The Film ends 
with Algren returning to the samurai village, where he lives with Taka.129 
Bedford Falls contended that the Film was developed independently 
of the Screenplay.130  The Film’s writer, Edward Zwick, alleged that 
before the Benays’ Screenplay was pitched to Solomon, he had 
conceived of his own story about a war veteran confronting Japanese 
culture.131  Zwick invited John Logan and Marshall Herskovitz to work 
with him on this project, and by April 12, 2000, one month before the 
Benays’ agent submitted the Screenplay to Bedford Falls, they had 
independently formed all of the main elements of what would become 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 630. 
 131 Id. 
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the Film.132 
The Benays alleged that the creators of the Film copied many 
aspects from the Screenplay without permission, and they filed suit on 
December 5, 2005, two years after the release of the Film.133  Warner 
Bros. Entertainment, Inc., Bedford Falls Productions, Inc., Radar 
Pictures, Inc., Edward Zwick, John Logan, and Marshall Herskovitz 
(collectively “Warner Brothers”) were named as defendants.134  The 
Benays asserted four claims for relief: copyright infringement under 
federal law, as well as breach of contract, breach of confidence, and 
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage under 
California law.135  Arguing that the Benays could not establish 
substantial similarity between the Screenplay and the Film, Warner 
Brothers moved for summary judgment on the copyright and breach of 
contract claims.136 
The United States District Court for the Central District of 
California granted summary judgment to Warner Brothers on both 
claims.137  The district court reasoned that since all the similarities 
between the works arose from unprotectable elements, no reasonable 
juror could find that the Benays’ Screenplay and Warner Brothers’ Film 
were substantially similar for purposes of copyright infringement.138  In 
addition, the district court found that there was insufficient evidence of 
similarities on which a reasonable juror could conclude that Warner 
Brothers actually used the Benays’ Screenplay under a California breach 
of an implied-in-fact contract claim.139  The Benays appealed the grant of 
summary judgment and the case went before the Ninth Circuit.140 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING AND REASONING 
The Ninth Circuit held that Warner Brothers was properly granted 
summary judgment on the copyright infringement claim because a 
comparison of the two works showed that the similarities were merely 
between unprotectable elements.141  However, the Ninth Circuit held that 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 623. 
 134 Id. at 622. 
 135 Id. at 623. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 629. 
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such similarities may be sufficient to find that an implied-in-fact contract 
was breached.142  Thus, the Ninth Circuit recognized that unlike a federal 
copyright infringement claim, in a California breach of implied-in-fact 
contract claim, the court may inquire whether the unprotectable elements 
as well as the protectable elements are substantially similar.143  
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment on 
the contract claim and remanded for the district court to determine 
whether there was actual use of the Benays’ Screenplay by Warner 
Brothers.144 
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMING THE GRANT OF 
 WARNER BROTHERS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 
 FEDERAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CLAIM 
Since Warner Brothers did not deny that the Benays owned a valid 
copyright, the issue on appeal for the copyright infringement claim was 
whether there was substantial similarity between the two works.145  
Applying the extrinsic test, the Ninth Circuit compared the two works’ 
plot, characters, theme, settings, mood, pace, dialogue, title and sequence 
of events.146  The Ninth Circuit did not find it surprising that a 
Hollywood film about the samurai rebellion would tell the story from an 
American character’s perspective.147  To the extent the works shared 
themes, scenes and dialogue, these elements arose naturally from the 
storyline of an American war veteran who travels to Japan to fight the 
samurai.148  And, although the leader of the samurai rebellion was one of 
the works’ main characters, this character was based on Saigo Takamori, 
a historical figure commonly associated with the samurai rebellion.149  
Likewise, the shared title between the Screenplay and the Film was also 
insignificant because Saigo Takamori is commonly referred to as “The 
Last Samurai.”150  Ultimately, although the two works shared a number 
of similarities, the Ninth Circuit found that the similarities were between 
 142 Id. at 632. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 625. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 626. 
 148 Id. at 628. 
 149 Id. at 626-27 (citing Charles L. Yates, Saigo Takamori in the Emergence of Meiji Japan, 
28 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 449, 449 (1994); KENNETH G. HENSHALL, A HISTORY OF JAPAN: FROM 
STONE AGE TO SUPERPOWER 78 (Palgrave Macmillan 2d ed. 2004)). 
 150 Benay, 607 F.3d at 629 (citing Charles L. Yates, Saigo Takamori in the Emergence of 
Meiji Japan, 28 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 449, 449 (1994)). 
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unprotectable elements that flowed naturally from their shared premise 
and were therefore disregarded for purposes of federal copyright 
infringement.151 
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S RATIONALE FOR REVERSING AND 
 REMANDING THE GRANT OF WARNER BROTHERS’ MOTION FOR 
 SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE CALIFORNIA BREACH OF AN 
 IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT CLAIM 
The Ninth Circuit held that the absence of federal copyright 
infringement did not preclude a finding of substantial similarity for 
purposes of California breach of an implied-in-fact contract.152  Since 
Warner Brothers did not deny that the parties entered into an implied-in-
fact contract, the issue on appeal was whether there was substantial 
similarity to permit an inference of actual use of the Benays’ Screenplay 
by Warner Brothers.153  The Ninth Circuit found that when a completed 
creative work is submitted under an implied-in-fact contract, the 
elements covered by the contract are not limited to those elements that 
are protected by copyright.154  Thus, the court recognized that 
unprotectable elements can be used to show substantial similarity in a 
California breach of an implied-in-fact contract claim.155  The rationale is 
that although an unprotectable idea could not be adequate consideration 
for a promise to pay money, the disclosure of the idea may be of 
substantial benefit to the person to whom the idea is disclosed.156  
Therefore, unprotectable ideas may be what the production company is 
bargaining for and seeking to actually use in its movie.157  This principle 
was introduced by California Supreme Court Justice Roger J. Traynor in 
his dissenting opinion in Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.: 
The policy that precludes protection of an abstract idea by copyright 
does not prevent its protection by contract.  Even though an idea is not 
property subject to exclusive ownership, its disclosure may be of 
 151 Id. at 625. 
 152 Id. at 631. 
 153 Id. at 630. 
 154 Id. at 631 (“California case law does not support the proposition that when a complete 
script is submitted under an implied-in-fact contract, only those elements of the script that are 
protected under federal copyright law are covered by the contract.”). 
 155 Id. 
 156 Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 221 P.2d 73, 85 (Cal. 1950) (Traynor, J., 
dissenting). 
 157 Id. 
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substantial benefit to the person to whom it is disclosed.  That 
disclosure may therefore be consideration for a promise to pay.158 
Unprotectable elements may be of value to a producer since 
unprotectable elements “are not freely usable by the entertainment media 
until the latter are made aware of them.”159  For example, in Reginald v. 
New Line Cinema Corp., Rex Reginald submitted his idea for a movie 
entitled The Party Crasher’s Handbook to New Line Cinema with the 
condition of payment if his idea was used.160  Reginald brought a breach 
of implied-in-fact contract claim alleging that he was never paid after his 
idea was used for New Line Cinema’s motion picture film entitled The 
Wedding Crashers, which, like The Party Crasher’s Handbook, was 
about two bachelors who crashed parties.161  The California Court of 
Appeal, Second Appellate District, noted that there is no requirement that 
the substantial similarity be between protectable elements in a California 
breach of implied-in-fact contact.162  The rule is justified by the theory 
that the bargain is not for an idea itself, but for the services of conveying 
the idea.163 
For example, imagine that New Line Cinema obligated itself to pay 
for the disclosure of unprotectable scènes-à-faire involving beautiful 
women, gourmet food, and artfully blended drinks.  Although such ideas 
are unprotectable elements that naturally flow from a premise about two 
bachelors who crash parties, New Line Cinema might not have included 
such elements in its movie if it were not for the disclosure of the ideas.  
Hypothetically, New Line Cinema therefore entered into the bargain 
specifically to use these unprotectable ideas in its movie. Thus, unlike a 
federal copyright infringement claim, in which a showing of substantial 
similarity is limited to a comparison of protectable elements, actual use 
in a California breach of an implied-in-fact contract claim can be shown 
by substantial similarity between unprotectable elements.164  Such a 
standard, however, is problematic. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 265 (Cal. 1956). 
 160 Reginald v. New Line Cinema Corp., No. B190025, 2008 WL 588932, *1-3 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Mar. 5, 2008). 
 161 Id. at *4. 
 162 Id. (citing Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 256 P.2d 947, 956 (Cal. 1953)). 
 163 Chandler v. Roach, 319 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (“There is nothing 
unreasonable in the assumption that a producer would obligate himself to pay for the disclosure of an 
idea which he would otherwise be legally free to use, but which in fact, he would be unable to use 
but for the disclosure.”). 
 164 Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 632 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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C. THE NEED FOR A NEW STANDARD FOR DETERMINING ACTUAL USE 
1. The Standard Used in Benay Does Not Adequately Reflect Actual 
 Use of Plaintiff’s Idea by Defendant 
Under the standard used in Benay, a producer who accepts the 
submission of a screenwriter’s work but does not pay for it could be 
found liable for breach of an implied-in-fact contract, regardless of the 
fact that the producer did not actually use the screenwriter’s work to 
produce its film.165  For example, in Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures 
Corp., Art Buchwald alleged that he was contractually owed money for 
the use of his screenplay King for a Day in the Paramount Pictures film 
Coming to America, both of which were premised on an African 
aristocrat who travels to America.166  Since Paramount Pictures created a 
work with similar unprotectable elements that naturally arose from the 
two works’ shared premise, the court ruled in favor of Buchwald, finding 
that King for a Day and Coming to America were substantially similar 
for purposes of actual use.167  Furthermore, Paramount Pictures was 
found liable even though it contended that the film was developed 
independently from Buchwald’s work.168 
As Buchwald illustrates, by refusing to compensate the screenwriter 
after producing a work with similar unprotectable elements, the producer 
could be held liable to the screenwriter for breach of an implied-in-fact 
contract, whether or not the producer actually used the screenwriter’s 
work.169  It is entirely possible for two works created by two different 
parties to have similar unprotectable elements even though one party 
neither used nor copied the other party’s work when creating its own 
production.170  However, in such a situation, the producer, who is sued 
for breach of implied-in-fact contract for refusing to compensate the 
screenwriter, could be found liable simply because the work is based on 
 165 Peter Swarth, The Law of Ideas: New York and California Are More Than 3,000 Miles 
Apart, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 115, 130 (1990). 
 166 Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C 706083, 1990 WL 357611, at *15 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 1990). 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at *6 (noting that Paramount Pictures reportedly began developing the shooting script 
for Coming to America based upon a story by Eddie Murphy). 
 169 Peter Swarth, The Law of Ideas: New York and California Are More Than 3,000 Miles 
Apart, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 115, 130 (1990). 
 170 See, e.g., Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 625 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting 
that the Film and the Screenplay shared similarities between unprotectable elements even though the 
Film was allegedly developed independently from the Screenplay). 
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a similar idea that naturally flows from the screenwriter and producer’s 
shared type of genre.171  Thus, the standard used in Benay reflects not 
that the producer actually used the screenwriter’s work but that the 
producer merely created a work involving similar unprotectable elements 
that inevitably arise from their shared genre.172 
2. The Standard Used in Benay Impedes Copyright Law’s Attempt to 
 Promote the Free Flow of Ideas 
While federal copyright law attempts to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts,”173 the state contract law standard applied in 
Benay dissuades producers from accepting screenplays for fear of 
breaching an implied-in-fact contract.174  For instance, when a creative 
work is submitted to a producer, or any prospective purchaser for that 
matter, the screenwriter’s work may contain a vast amount of 
unprotectable ideas, all of which may be staples of literature and art.  To 
avoid liability under an implied-in-fact contract, a producer who accepts 
the screenwriter’s work must not only avoid using the screenplay but 
also avoid producing any work involving similar unprotectable 
elements.175  Holding a producer liable for failing to compensate the 
screenwriter after merely creating a work involving similar unprotectable 
elements will cause producers to be hesitant to accept screenplays for 
fear of breaching implied-in-fact contracts.176  Screenwriters will in turn 
be discouraged from expressing ideas and writing screenplays when they 
find it difficult to sell their works to producers.177 
For example, in Minniear v. Tors, Harold Minniear alleged that he 
entered into a contract with Ziv Television Program in which Minniear 
would be reasonably compensated if his idea for a television series 
entitled The Underwater Legion was used.178  After Ziv Television 
Program released the television series entitled Sea Hunt, which, like 
Minniear’s The Underwater Legion, was premised on an underwater 
 171 See, e.g., Buchwald, 1990 WL 357611, at *15. 
 172 Peter Swarth, The Law of Ideas: New York and California Are More Than 3,000 Miles 
Apart, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 115, 130 (1990). 
 173 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 174 Kelly Rem, Note, Idea Protection in California: Are Writers Too Readily Compensated for 
Their Screenplays?, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 333, 350 (2006). 
 175 Peter Swarth, The Law of Ideas: New York and California Are More Than 3,000 Miles 
Apart, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 115, 129 (1990). 
 176 Kelly Rem, Note, Idea Protection in California: Are Writers Too Readily Compensated for 
Their Screenplays?, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 333, 350 (2006). 
 177 Id. at 350-51. 
 178 Minniear v. Tors, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287, 291 (Ct. App. 1968). 
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adventure, Minniear brought a breach of implied-in-fact contract claim 
alleging that he was never compensated after his idea was used.179  The 
California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, held that there 
were enough similarities in the basic plot ideas between The Underwater 
Legion and Sea Hunt to infer that Ziv Television Program actually used 
Minniear’s idea.180  The money and resources absorbed by such litigation 
would discourage the producer from accepting further works submitted 
by other screenwriters.181  As a result, screenwriters will be disinclined 
to spend time and effort on writing screenplays when producers 
repeatedly decline to consider their ideas.182  Thus, the standard used in 
Benay discourages the free flow of ideas by imposing liability simply 
because the producer created a product involving unprotectable elements 
similar to those in the screenwriter’s work.183  Fortunately, there is a 
solution to this
IV. PROPOSED STANDARD FOR DETERMINING ACTUAL USE 
A. PROPOSED STANDARD DEFINED 
In a California claim for breach of an implied-in-fact contract over 
the use of an idea, a court may appropriately infer actual use through a 
showing of the defendant’s access to the plaintiff’s work and substantial 
similarity between the two works at issue.184  However, since the 
substantial-similarity standard used in Benay inadequately reflects actual 
use and discourages the free flow of ideas, courts should model the 
substantial-similarity standard in California breach of implied-in-fact 
contract claims after the federal copyright infringement standard found 
under the extrinsic test.  Specifically, a court should examine the 
individual elements of both works and separate the protectable elements 
from the unprotectable elements.  The court should then inquire into 
whether the protectable elements, and not the unprotectable elements, are 
substantially similar.  If all the similarities between the works arise from 
the use of unprotectable elements, the court should conclude that the 
plaintiff failed to demonstrate actual use.  In effect, the California 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. at 294. 
 181 Kelly Rem, Note, Idea Protection in California: Are Writers Too Readily Compensated for 
Their Screenplays?, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 333, 350 (2006). 
 182 Id. at 350-51. 
 183 Id. at 350. 
 184 Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522, 534 (Ct. App. 1982). 
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standard would match the federal standard such that if the court does not 
find substantial similarity under a federal copyright infringement claim, 
the court should be precluded from finding substantial similarity under a 
California breach of implied-in-fact contract claim.  Therefore, to 
successfully prove that the defendant has actually used his or her idea, 
the plaintiff must show substantial similarity between protectable 
elements, not unprotectable elements. 
B. PROPOSED STANDARD JUSTIFIED 
1. The Proposed Standard for Determining Actual Use Better 
 Indicates Actual Use of Plaintiff’s Idea by Defendant 
Substantial similarity between protectable elements, rather than 
unprotectable elements, is a better indication that an idea was disclosed 
by the plaintiff and used by the defendant.  In Green v. Schwarzenegger, 
William Green, author of a screenplay entitled The Minotaur, brought an 
action alleging copyright infringement by the creators of the movie 
Terminator 2: Judgment Day.185  Although both works contained a 
similar message about the future of mankind, the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California found no infringement 
because a closer examination of the protectable elements in the two 
works exposed more dissimilarities than similarities.186  As Green 
demonstrates, even though two works can share the same basic plot 
premise, they can have completely different protectable elements.187  
Whereas unprotectable elements naturally arise from the limited amount 
of ideas within the public domain,188  protectable elements do not derive 
from basic plot premises.189  Because of a protectable element’s original 
character, it is less likely for two authors to express the same protectable 
element in their respective works.  Therefore, substantial similarity 
between protectable elements, rather than unprotectable elements, better 
reflects the possibility that the defendant actually used the plaintiff’s 
idea. 
 185 Green v. Schwarzenegger, No. CV 93-5893-WMB, 1995 WL 874191, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 
July 12, 1995). 
 186 Id. at *18 (“[T]he evil Terminator’s ability to mold its liquid metal body in any shape, 
which gives rise to its ability to grow ‘adaptable limbs,’ is very different from the Minotaur’s less 
technologically sophisticated shape-changing.”). 
 187 See generally id. at *18. 
 188 See Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 271 (Cal. 1956) (“It is manifest that authors must 
work with and from ideas or themes which basically are in the public domain.”). 
 189 See generally Green, 1995 WL 874191, at *18. 
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The standard of proof proposed by this Note will create a better 
filter to separate those cases dealing with actual instances of 
unauthorized copying from those cases dealing with coincidental 
similarities.  For example, in Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner 
Entertainment Co., Gwen O’Donnell and Funky Films, creators of the 
screenplay The Funk Parlor, brought a copyright infringement action 
against Time Warner Entertainment, producer of the television series Six 
Feet Under.190  Limiting its analysis to similarities between protectable 
elements, the Ninth Circuit concluded that The Funk Parlor and Six Feet 
Under were not substantially similar, given that the similarities between 
the death of a caring father and return of a detached son were 
unprotectable scènes-à-faire and “at best, coincidental.”191  The limited 
amount of unprotectable scenes and characters that necessarily flow from 
a shared premise leaves ample opportunity for natural and coincidental 
similarities.192  Furthermore, these similarities between unprotectable 
elements can exist simply because such elements frequently occur in all 
forms of art and science.193  Protectable elements, however, stem from 
more-unique ideas than mere unprotectable scènes-à-faire, and a 
protectable element’s uniqueness makes it easier to recognize instances 
of coincidental similarities.  The more unique and rare an element is in a 
creative work, the more likely that any similarity to the element was the 
result of the defendant actually using the plaintiff’s idea.  Thus, a 
standard that permits a showing of substantial similarity between 
protectable elements only will provide a better sense of actual use by 
giving judges and triers of fact more confidence in determining when the 
elements of the works at issue are coincidentally similar. 
2. The Proposed Standard for Determining Actual Use Will Provide 
 State Contract Law Protection While Preserving the Purposes and 
 Objectives of Federal Copyright Law 
Requiring substantial similarity strictly between protectable 
elements will preserve copyright law’s idea-expression dichotomy by 
denying protection to unprotectable elements.  In Berkic v. Crichton, for 
instance, Ted Berkic wrote a screenplay called Reincarnation and 
brought an action for copyright infringement against the makers of a 
 190 Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 191 Id. at 1081. 
 192 See generally, Desny, 299 P.2d at 271. 
 193 See Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The common use of such 
stock . . . merely reminds us that in Hollywood, as in the life of men generally, there is only rarely 
anything new under the sun.”). 
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movie entitled Coma, which, like Reincarnation, involved young 
professionals exposed to a criminal investigation.194  Limiting its 
comparison to strictly protectable elements, the Ninth Circuit found no 
substantial similarity between the protectable elements of the works and 
noted that similarity between unprotectable elements “merely reminds us 
that in Hollywood, as in the life of men generally, there is only rarely 
anything new under the sun.”195  With a requirement that substantial 
similarity be shown between protectable elements, screenwriters will not 
be given monopolies over customary staples of literature and art.196  The 
public will therefore be encouraged to use the same unprotectable ideas 
in creating their own works, while authors will be afforded state contract 
law protection over their protectable expressions.197 
Since the standard used in Benay impedes the production of works 
of art and science, the state law standard should yield to the federal law 
standard as a matter of conflict preemption.198  In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., Bonita Boats, a boat manufacturer, sought to 
enjoin Thunder Craft Boats from using a direct molding process199 to 
duplicate Bonita Boats’ boat hulls.200  At the time, a Florida statute made 
it unlawful for any person to use the direct molding process to duplicate 
products for sale without the written permission of the other party.201  
The United States Supreme Court held that since the Florida statute stood 
as an obstacle to the federal policy favoring the free competition of 
unprotectable ideas, the state law must be invalidated to the extent that it 
conflicted with the federal law.202  Along the same lines, since the 
standard used in Benay impedes the promotion of art and science by 
offering protection to unprotectable ideas, the state law standard should 
match the federal law standard so as to create a national uniform rule that 
safeguards only protectable expression, thereby encouraging the free 
 194 Id. at 1291. 
 195 Id. at 1294. 
 196 Id. at 1293-94. 
 197 Id. at 1291. 
 198 Conflict preemption occurs when the federal law controls and the state law is invalidated 
because the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the objectives of federal law. 
See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989). 
 199 Direct molding process is the process by which one party uses a particular product to 
create a mold for mass production and sale of a duplicate product.  Id. at 163-64. 
 200 Id. at 145. 
 201 Id. at 144-45. 
 202 Id. at 151 (“[S]tate regulation of intellectual property must yield to the extent that it 
clashes with the balance struck by Congress . . . .”). 
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flow of ideas.203  As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor articulated for the 
unanimous court: 
One of the fundamental purposes behind the Patent and Copyright 
Clauses of the Constitution was to promote national uniformity in the 
realm of intellectual property. . . . Given the inherently ephemeral 
nature of property in ideas, and the great power such property has to 
cause harm to the competitive policies which underlay the federal 
patent [and copyright] laws, the demarcation of broad zones of public 
and private right is “the type of regulation that demands a uniform 
national rule.”204 
CONCLUSION 
Now picture again the screenwriter who watches a movie and 
realizes that it is substantially similar to one of her very own registered 
screenplays.  If the screenwriter brings a breach of an implied-in-fact 
contract claim under California law, without a requirement that the 
similarity be between protectable elements, the production company 
could be found liable if the film involved the same unprotectable 
elements as the screenwriter’s work, regardless of the fact that the 
producer did not actually use the screenwriter’s idea.  It is not hard to 
imagine the flood gates opening, the crowds of screenwriters filing 
lawsuits, and the producer’s last few words: lights, camera . . . civil 
action.  In California breach of implied-in-fact contract claims, courts 
should use the standard proposed by this Note, so that, in order to 
successfully prove that the defendant has actually used his or her idea, 
the plaintiff must show substantial similarity between protectable 
elements, not unprotectable elements. 
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